Sunday, August 28, 2011

Truth of Pearl harbor - 11 and Did FDR knew about it in advance ?

Lies being taught;

Fredrick Delano Roosevelt the WW2 President of USA was taken by surprise by Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.

Now the truth;


Roosevelt and Churchill had already been working on a plan to get America to enter the war in Europe.


After the German ship Bismarck sank the British ship known as the Hood, Churchill suggested in April, 1941 that an American warship should find the Prinz Eugen (the Bismarck's escort ship) then draw her fire, "....thus providing the incident for which the United States would be so thankful..." i.e., bring her into the war. While Roosevelt planned for such a provocation in the Atlantic, Hitler told his naval commanders in July, 1941, to avoid confrontation with the United States while his Russian campaign was in progress.

While FDR was pushing Japan into drawing first blood, he told the American public in his famous campaign statement of 1940:

"While I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, and I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

Then he said later that he wouldn't send our boys to war unless we were attacked.

Former President Herbert Hoover observed the various political manipulations, and said in August, 1941:

"The American people should insistently demand that Congress put a stop to step-by-step projection of the United States into undeclared war..."

Evidence that FDR knew in advance about Pearl Harbor;-

On January 27, 1941, Ambassador Grew sent a telegram to the Secretary of State to report the following:
"The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he heard from many sources, including a Japanese source, that, in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor."
(Source: U.S. Department of State Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 617-618)

In August, 1941, Congressman Martin Dies, Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, collected evidence that the Japanese were planning to attack Pearl Harbor. The Committee was in possession of a strategic map, prepared by the Japanese Imperial Military Intelligence Department that clearly indicated their plans to attack Pearl Harbor. Dies was told not to go public with his information.

An Army Intelligence officer in the Far East discovered the plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, and prior to the attack, sent three separate messages to Washington detailing the plan. Soviet agent Richard Sorge told the Russian Government in October, 1941 that "the Japanese intend to attack Pearl Harbor in the next 60 days," and received a response from his superiors that the information had been passed onto President Roosevelt. Dusko Popov, a British double agent, received information from Germany about Japan's plans, and passed the information onto Washington. It was never acted on.

As early as 1944, Presidential candidate and New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey said that Roosevelt knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor before it happened. In documents declassified by the National Security Agency in 1981, [it was revealed that] America had broken the Blue (diplomatic) and Purple (naval) secret codes of the Japanese, knew all the details of the attack, and the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet. From September, 1941, until the attack itself, all Japanese communications had been intercepted and decoded by American intelligence, and indicated an impending attack on Pearl Harbor.

One transmission, from a fake weather report broadcast on a Japanese short-wave station contained the words "higashi no kaze ame" which means "east wind, rain" which the Americans already knew was the Japanese code for war with the United States. Top military officials denied that the "winds" message existed and attempted to destroy all traces of its receipt.

Late in November, 1941 the following order was sent out to all U.S. military commanders: "The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act." According to Secretary of War Stimson, this order came directly from Roosevelt. According to Stimson's diary, 9 people in the war cabinet, all the military people, knew about FDR's plan of provocation.

The State Department knew on November 20th [1941] that a naval force which included four of the largest Japanese aircraft carriers was heading towards Hawaii, and this information was passed on to Pearl Harbor on November 27th. However, the American base in Hawaii was not given this information. Three days before the attack, Australian Intelligence spotted the Japanese fleet heading for Hawaii. They sent a warning to Washington, but it was dismissed by Roosevelt who said it was a politically motivated rumor circulated by the Republicans.

On December 1, 1941, the head of the Far East Division of U.S. Naval Intelligence wrote in his report to head of the Pacific Fleet: "War between the United States and Japan will begin in the nearest future." The Report never made it to the commander's desk, because it had been 'accidentally' detained by his superiors.
Early in December, Army Intelligence knew that the diplomats at the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been ordered to destroy all codes and to return to Japan. Washington also knew that Japan had ordered all of its merchant ships home, because they would be needed to transport soldiers and supplies for the war. On December 5, Col. Sadtler from U.S. Military Communications transmitted the following telegram to his superiors, based on information he had received: "War with Japan will begin immediately; exclude all possibility of a second Port Arthur." This telegram never got to its destination.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobold, USN retired, author of The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, and Col. Curtis B. Dall, the son-in-law of FDR, in an interview with Anthony Hilder for his book Warlords of Washington admitted that they [FDR and his staff] knew about the Pearl Harbor attack before it occurred. Theobold, the Commander of all the destroyers at Pearl Harbor, said in his book that Roosevelt knew about the attack 21 hours before it happened. Theobold wrote:
"An incontestable fact in the true history of Pearl Harbor is the repeated withholding from Admiral Kimmel and General Walter C. Short [the Navy and Army commanders at Pearl Harbor] of supremely important military information ... There's never been a case in history when a commander was not informed that his country will be at war within a few hours and that his forces will most likely become the first object of attack at sunrise."

Theobold also cited the testimony of Admiral Harold Stark (head of Navy Headquarters in Washington) who did not reveal Japan's de facto declaration of war to Admiral Kimmel, and said he was acting on orders from a "higher authority" referring to Roosevelt... General Marshall merely passed on the Roosevelt directive of December 4th, which said that no communications could be sent to Pearl Harbor, unless it was cleared by Marshall.

On November 26, 1941, Roosevelt sent an ultimatum insisting that the Japanese withdraw all their troops [from China]. He refused any negotiations with Prince Kenoye, the Japanese Prime Minister, even though Joseph Grew , the Ambassador to Japan, said that such a meeting would prevent war with the Japanese. The Japanese response from Tokyo to the Japanese embassy, encrypted in the "Purple" code, was intercepted by the Navy, decoded, and given to Roosevelt on the evening of December 6th. The thirteen-point communiqué revealed, that because of the intense pressure of the economic sanctions, diplomatic relations with the United States were being terminated at 1:00 PM Eastern time on Sunday, December 7th. For all intents and purposes, this was a declaration of war and upon reading it Roosevelt said: "This means war." It was not passed onto the Pearl Harbor command, and it was at that time that the attack began.

The Administration discovered that in 1941 a Japanese naval officer was working at the Japanese consulate in Honolulu under an assumed name. They followed him, and began to intercept his messages to Japan, which enabled the Japanese to develop a timetable for the attack, and even bomb plots. They never stopped him, and it enabled the Japanese to prepare themselves for an attack against us.

Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey wrote:
"Our intelligence data spoke of a likely attack by Japan on the Philippines or the Dutch East Indies. Although Pearl Harbor wasn't excluded from discussion, everything relayed to us pointed to other objects of attack. If we had known that the Japanese were continually collecting detailed information about the exact location and movements of our warships in Pearl Harbor (which is made clear by intercepted reports), we naturally would have concentrated our efforts on preparations to repel an attack on Pearl Harbor."

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, after meeting with the Roosevelt administration on November 25, 1941, wrote in his diary:
"The discussion was about how we should maneuver to force the Japanese to fire the first shot, while not exposing ourselves to too great a danger; this will be a difficult task."

Admiral Husband E. Kimmel wrote in his memoirs:
"It was part of Roosevelt's plan that no warning be sent to the Hawaiian Islands. Our leaders in Washington, who deliberately didn't inform our forces in Pearl Harbor, cannot be justified in any way. The Pearl Harbor Command wasn't informed at all about ... the American note of November 26, 1941, delivered to the Japanese ambassador, which practically excluded further negotiations and made war in the Pacific inevitable. The Army and Navy Command in the Hawaiian Islands received not even a hint about intercepted and deciphered Japanese telegrams which were forwarded to concerned parties in Washington on the 6th and 7th of December, 1941."

The Pacific fleet had consisted of nine battleships, three aircraft carriers, and some smaller ships. The aircraft carriers and the smaller, more mobile ships were moved prior to the attack because Roosevelt knew they would be needed for a war at sea. On November 28th Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey (under Kimmel's command) sailed to Wake Island with the carrier Enterprise, three heavy destroyers and nine small destroyers; and on December 5th, the Lexington, three heavy cruisers and five destroyers were sent to Midway, and the Saratoga went to the Pacific Coast. The battleships that remained at Pearl Harbor were considered dispensable, because they had been produced during and prior to World War I and were viewed as old and obsolete. They were to be sacrificed [along with the men --ed].

The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, instead of attacking Russia, as they originally intended to do. The next day, Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan:
"We don't like it -- and we didn't want to get in it -- but we are in it and we're going to fight it with everything we've got."

The attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the deaths of 2,341 American soldiers and 2,233 more who were injured or missing. The obsolete or dispensable eight battleships, only two destroyers, only two squadron minesweepers, were sunk or damaged. All of this just to create an anti-Japanese sentiment in the country and justify American action against Japan.

General George C. Marshall (Supreme Commander of the U.S. Army), and Admiral Harold R. Stark (Supreme Commander of the U.S. Navy) in Washington, testified that the message about the attack was not forwarded to Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short because the Hawaiian base had received so many intercepted Japanese messages that another one would have confused them. In truth, Marshall sat on the information for 15 hours because he didn't want anything to interfere with the attack. The message was [finally] sent after the attack started. Internal Army and Navy inquiries in 1944 found Kimmel and Short derelict of duty, but the truth was not revealed to the public.

Eleven days after the attack, the Roberts Commission, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts, made scapegoats of Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short who were denied open hearings, publicly ruined, and forced to retire. Short died in 1949, and Kimmel died in 1968.

The most incredible of the eight investigations was a joint House-Senate investigation that echoed the Roberts Commission. Both Marshall and Stark testified that they couldn't remember where they were the night the declaration of war had come in. A close friend of Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, later said that Knox, Stark, and Marshall spent most of that night with Roosevelt in the White House waiting for the bombing to begin so they could enter the war. According to historian John Toland, Marshall told his top officers: "Gentlemen, this goes to the grave with us."

In 1995, a Department of Defense study concluded that "Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications ... which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war."
From November 17th to 25th, the U.S. Navy intercepted 83 messages that Yamamoto sent to his carriers.

This Pearl Harbor scenario was a repeat of the American battleship "Maine" which was [reportedly] sunk by a Spanish mine in the port of Havana, Cuba in 1898. The rallying cry of "Remember the Maine" was used to stir up anti-Spanish hysteria in America to justify us declaring war on Spain. Years later, when the ship was examined, it was established that the hull had been blown out by an explosion from inside the ship.

The pearl Harbor scenario was also a repeat of sinking of American ship “Lusitania’ which was sunk eight miles off the Irish coast by a U-boat on May 7, 1915. The sinking enraged American public opinion where 128 victims came from. Robert Lansing, the U.S. secretary of state, later wrote that the sinking gave him the 'conviction we would ultimately become the ally of Britain'.

The war turned the United States into a nation that consumed more than it produced, creating unemployment and financial instability.


On the European front, the War enabled the Russians to gain control of Eastern Europe, promoted Communism, paved the way for the creation of the nation of Israel.

At a cost of about $400 billion, the War raised US National Debt to $220 billion, and pushed US deeper into the clutches of the international bankers. Because of all the intricate angles involved in this conflict, it would not be an understatement to say that World War II was probably the most costly event in American history. US may have temporarily won (with aid of nuclear weapons or WMDs), but in the long run, it lost.

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